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F.W. Sweet CW5005

A single volley with double-loaded muskets followed by a controlled forward rush, would be enough to disperse the enemy."
In 1854 Marshal St. Arnaud issued Bugeaud's instruction almost verbatim to the troops on their way to the Crimea. It worked. The Russians did not have rifles.
In 1859 in North Italy the French tried it again and Napoleon III issued the same orders, "The new weapons are dangerous only at long range; they do not prevent the bayonet from being, as in the past, the terrible arm of the French infantry." This time the French soldiers faced Austrians, not Russians, and the Austrians were armed with Lorenz rifles. Astonishingly, it worked again. It should not have, but it did, and everyone learned the wrong lesson.⁵

The Austrians thereupon adopted the tactics that France had used successfully against them. Seven years later in the Austro-Prussian war, they tried the stately French bayonet charge against the Prussians. Somehow it failed to work for them. Instead, "the dense formations of the cold- steel-oriented Austrian army, still mesmerized by the successful bayonet attacks of their French opponents in the North Italian war of 1859, were cut to pieces by the Prussian infantry."⁶

Meanwhile, in the US, Hardee, Casey, and others translated the Chasseur tactics. Memorized by thousands of officers and hundreds of thousands of men, North and South, they yielded the worst of both worlds: daily drill at a furious marching pace, followed by combat where defensive rifle fire cut down attackers nonetheless.
Volunteer officers and their men had to use the French tactics. It was all they had. Neither side could begin a leisurely study of new methods in the midst of a desperate war. As late as 1863 officer candidates for black regiments were still being tested on their knowledge of the obsolete drill.⁷

On the other hand, Antietam, Fredericksburg and Gettysburg made the inadequacy of close-order bayonet assault obvious to all. Some of the more daring officers began to innovate. Four of their experiments are significant to hindsight by pointing the way to pieces of the answer: successive lines, short rushes, column assault, and offensive trenches.

Successive Lines
The first consisted of launching a succession of two-rank lines, about 150 yards apart. The idea was to deliver successive waves of fire and shock. The problem was that, more often than

5_{Ibid. p. 55-57.}
6_{English, On Infantryp. 2.}
7_{Glatthaar, Forged in Battlep. 44-45}

F.W. Sweet CW5006

not, the front waves stalled and successive lines merged, bunching the whole assault force into a vulnerable mob.
Trying to solve the bunching problem by better discipline simply increased casualties. George Thomas, for instance, trained his men so well that they even climbed Kennesaw Mountain in formal lines which did not bunch. The result was Sherman's most spectacular defeat.⁸

Emory Upton persuaded his superiors to let him try something similar at Spottsylvania on 10 May 1864. While Meade, Hancock, Warren, and Burnside stationed themselves on hills from which they could observe the attack, Upton placed his men in three lines, each four regiments deep. He gave detailed orders for the first line to break left and right when within the enemy position, the second to halt at the enemy works and fire straight ahead, the third to lie down farther to the rear, and the fourth to stay in reserve at the edge of a wood 200 yards away. Upton carried the position but, finding himself three fourths of a mile ahead of the Union line with no prospect of support, he withdrew with about 1100 casualties on each side. The effort earned Colonel Upton his first star.⁹

The main fruit of these attempts was to show that there was simply no way to organize a reasonable number of attackers so as to saturate a defensive rifle line. Upton's post-war thought, in particular, benefited from his having personally demonstrated what would not work.

Short Rushes
The idea of taking cover just before each defending volley, then rising and rushing forward a few yards between volleys, occurred to many soldiers from the start. It was well known in the trans-Mississippi theater, where raids and ambushes were more common than set-piece battles, but was also seen farther east.
At Fort Donelson on 15 February 1862, General Morgan L. Smith's brigade of two regiments was advancing in a succession of lines. On command, the second line moved up, formed on the left of the first, and both lay down. Meanwhile, their skirmishers continued to deliver what today's eye sees as embryonic suppressive fire. Each time defenders' fire slackened, the brigade would rise to its feet, rush forward, absorb its skirmishers and lay back down. At this point their skirmishers would again deploy forward and open fire. Repeating the cycle--dropping

8_{Mahon, "Civil War Infantry Assault Tactics" in Military Affairsp. 63}
9_{Ambrose, Upton and the Armyp. 31-33.}

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Copyright © 1999-2002. ConsimWorld.COM. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium without express written permission is prohibited. Web Masters are encouraged to link directly to this page, this URL is not subject to change. For general site information: kranz@consimworld.com

Copyright © 1999-2002. ConsimWorld.COM. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium without express written permission is prohibited. Web Masters are encouraged to link directly to this page, this URL is not subject to change. For general site information: kranz@consimworld.com

Copyright © 1999, 2000 ConsimWorld.COM. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium without express written permission is prohibited. Web Masters are encouraged to link directly to this page, this URL is not subject to change. For general site information: kranz@consimworld.com