We became acquainted with Maurice Suckling with his game Freeman’s Farm 1777 from Worthington Publishing in 2019 and really enjoyed the mechanics and how they all came together to create an interactive and interesting look at the Battle of Saratoga during the American Revolution. Since that time, Maurice has designed several other games that have went on to successful Kickstarter campaigns including Hidden Strike: American Revolution, Chancellorsville 1863 and 1565 Siege of Malta. He is now working on a game that is tied to the buildup of tensions that led to the outbreak of The Great War called Crisis: 1914 from Worthington Publishing, which was successfully funded on Kickstarter this past summer. He has prepared a series of Event Card Spoilers for the game and we are hosting them here on the blog. These posts will share the cards basis in history as well as how they are used in the game.
If you are interested in ordering Crisis: 1914, you can pre-order a copy for $65.00 from the Worthington Publishing website at the following link: https://www.worthingtonpublishing.com/collection/crisis-1914-pre-order-this-game-will-not-ship-until-february-2024
Card #1 – Hugo Haase – Leader of the Social Democratic Party
A dedicated pacifist with a very strong voice against the involvement of Germany in the Crisis, Hugo Haase who was the son of Jewish shoemaker and small businessman, Nathan Haase, found common ground with the French Socialist Leader Jean Jaurès at the meeting of the International Socialist Union held in Brussels in July 1914 (McMeekin 2013, 322). Haase eventually voted in support of war credits on August 4th, but it is likely that this decision was more a product of political pressure from his own party and others outside than an actual ideological shift on his part (McMeekin 2013, 378).
Card #3 – Negotiations with Ottomans
A rapid series of negotiations were held at the height of the Crisis after Hans von Wangenheim, the German Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, initially rejected an alliance proposal on July 22nd. Following this the Kaiser insisted von Wangenheim return to the negotiating table. On August 1st, Bethmann Hollweg authorized Wangenheim to sign a treaty as Wangenheim recommended deploying the German Cruiser SMS Goeben to Constantinople. The treaty was formally signed on August 2nd, although the Ottomans did not declare war against the members of the Triple Entente until roughly three months afterward (McMeekin 2013, 353-354).
Card #7 – Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky – Ambassador to Britain
Cousin to the Russian Ambassador to Britain, Alexander von Benckendorff, and an avowed Anglophile (Otte 2014, 146; McMeekin 2013, 72, 217), Prince Lichnowsky was a consistent voice for peace during the crisis, driven equally by a genuine interest in securing a rapprochement between Germany and Britain and a genuine distrust of Germany’s ever-strengthening relationship with Austria-Hungary (Otte 2014, 166; Martel 2014, 181). Even as the situation escalated, he remained close to Grey and attempted to provide some insight into the fears driving his superiors in Berlin, all the while warning Bethmann Hollweg and Jagow that their decisions risked bringing Britain into conflict against them (Martel 2014, 117, 201; McMeekin 2013, 233; Otte 2014, 167; Clark 2012, 529-530). However, his reports and recommendations were frequently taken lightly, “as he himself knew well enough” (Otte 2014, 167).
Card #10 – Arthur Zimmermann – Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
As Thomas Otte describes him, Arthur Zimmermann was “a competent, conscientious and diligent administrator, [who] had nevertheless a reputation for shooting from the lip” (Otte 2014, 79-80). Zimmermann filled in for Gottlieb von Jagow at the start of the crisis, when the latter was away on his honeymoon, and appears to have supported an Austro-Hungarian response to Serbia early, even as he “warned against confronting Belgrade with ‘humiliating demands’” (Clark 2012, 399-400, 402).
After the war, Zimmermann testified that in a conversation with Alexander Hoyos on July 5, he “considered an energetic communication to Serbia… a matter of course in view of the provocation” and predicted “a 90% likelihood of a European war” (Otte 2014, 79). Despite this apparent foresight, he still insisted that Germany would back Austria-Hungary’s decision (Otte 2014, 79; Clark 2012, 413-414).
Card #13 – Kaiser Wilhelm II – Emperor of Germany
Cousin of King George V and Czar Nicholas II and close friend to the assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Wilhelm II was a mercurial figure, known for a tendency toward vigorous mood swings and driven by a need to be “the stag at every hunt, the bride at every wedding, and the corpse at every funeral” (Balfour 1964, 125); it has been claimed that his persona was the result of a deep-seated personal insecurity, itself the end product of his difficult birth, a withered left arm, and the real or imagined perception of martial and political weakness (McMeekin 2013, 81).
The Kaiser frequently vacillated throughout the Crisis between demanding immediate action against Serbia and backpedaling in the face of the broader implications of war. Upon learning that Count Tschirschky initially advised Berchtold to act with restraint, for example, Wilhelm reacted in anger: “Matters must be cleared up with the Serbs, and that right soon” (McMeekin 2013, 85-86). However, his familial ties to both Britain and Russia increasingly came to play a part in his desire to mediate between the various powers and forestall the looming conflict (McMeekin 2013, 242-244, 256, 285-287, 347-349).
The situation in the Balkans notwithstanding, Wilhelm would depart for his annual cruise to Norway on July 6th and only return to Berlin on July 27th (Martel 2014, 109; McMeekin 2013, 223).
Card #14 – Fait Accompli
There was a German push for Austria-Hungary to launch a swift, decisive attack against Serbia and thereby leave the remainder of Europe with no other option but to accept the outcome.
As early as July 2nd, voices within the German military began to call for military action before France or Russia could prepare a response of their own (Fromkin 2004, 156). By July 6th, the sentiment had solidified into a broader consensus that Austria-Hungary should strike quickly and with overwhelming force in an attempt to minimize the potential for a continental conflict (Otte 2014, 78; Fromkin 2004, 158).
If you missed the previous entries in the series, you can catch up on the posts to date by following the below links:
Series Introduction and General Mobilization Cards
If you are interested, we posted an interview with the designer and you can read that at the following link: https://theplayersaid.com/2023/07/12/interview-with-maurice-suckling-designer-of-crisis-1914-from-worthington-publishing-currently-on-kickstarter/
-Grant
The Players' Aid 