Having set the first discussion I invite readers to respond with their comments, arguments, counterpoints etc

Hello Jean.

I really like your idea of creating this forum. We can learn a lot and give some interesting ideas.

I do not know if you are familiar with the rules of SIMTAC (Los Arapiles, Sagunto) in those rules it focuses the near action in the morale and not in the clash of troops, You get very rarely to the fray, I think, if you have not read them you might be interested, I'm trying to find a PDF version in English to be able to upload it to the forum.

As for the debate with Ed, I think there are two points of view: the players 'and the publishers' games.

The drift I'm seeing with the rules I do not like. It is happening as with ASL and Starter Kit, there is a tendency to simplify the games and to let them become less simulation.

The word I least like is "playability" with it have been distorted many good rules.

I hope that new and better ideas will come and that they can be implemented in tactical simulations.

Regards

Statement: Actual close combat using cold steel never occured in open terrain during the Napoleonic era.

Source(s): Charles Armand du Picq

Conclusion: There is no need for Melee Charts involving odds and other factors, assessing casualties possibly to both sides, when such events never occurred. Replace this with a Morale Check involving both the attacker and defender with the winner gaining ground and the loser routing away.

This seems to be generally true, although maybe not universally. I think the famous battlefield report by Napoleon's surgeon Larrey after Wagram(?) revealed how few wounds -- only a couple -- were caused by bayonet. But it was clearly the fear of the bayonet that led to the flight of the defenders, as was demonstrated by Friedrich's grenadiers who occasionally weren't even supplied with ammunition and had their bayonets welded onto their barrels. Hence perhaps the concept of "impetus" is derived from this situation: The more it appears that the advancing unit is bound to its path of cold steel the greater the fear in the defender. One reason the "French style" was often to keep moving, not stopping to exchange volleys.

Then you examine what happens at say Waterloo when you have defenders that don't retire before the infantry charge. Sort of calling the bluff. And even though bayonet wasn't used commonly, the muskets were fired at close range, as in the ACW. So a failed bayonet charge might devolve into a firefight and local officers look for opportunities to charge or countercharge from that.

I seem to recall a LaBatt mechanic (last time I played; I believe ME's "Eylau") where shock combat involved the morale check of the attacker followed by that of the defender if the attacker passed. If both passed, the combat went to the "melee" table where it was resolved. Most gamers likely viewed this as hand-to-hand, but it would also reflect just close range fire combat and whatever else happened at close quarters.

I would be interested, Jean, in a particular mechanic you would suggest for the LB and BAR games to reflect your view. Just having morale checks alone with no concomitant losses would ignore the musketry that ensued in a bayonet charge.

This forum is a great idea. Of the Age of Reason, and the La Bataille series, I enjoy Age of Reason the most. I would personally like to see Age of Reason rules and charts adapted to the games in the La Bataille series because I think they are most complete. But both game systems are excellent and have a dedicated following for different reasons. Here are some superb books I recommend to any serious students of the military systems in these times.

http://yalebooks.com/book/9780300073850/tactics-and-experience-battle-age-napoleon

https://www.amazon.com/Anatomy-Victory-Battle-Tactics-1689-1763/dp/0870520148

https://www.amazon.com/Military-Experience-Reason-Christopher-Duffy/dp/113899586X

My reading in these sources suggests that infantry close combat did not seem to result in a clash of steel, but that cavalry engagements certainly did.

Statement: Actual close combat using cold steel never occured in open terrain during the Napoleonic period

Probably true.

Think of the fire process as how the game models fire at ranges beyond say 20 metres. The melee process is how it models fighting at ranges below 20 metres, and so has two components - casualty creation and holding the ground. You can't ignore the casualty component, as this is where most musket casualties occurred - 70% according to the only study I've seen.

And these were short - 5 minutes is an eternity here - 5 to 10 shots.

Also, on average infantrymen fired 20 shots in a day's fighting. Offensively, it seems as if infantry battalions were single-use formations in the main - though d'Erlon's corps at Waterloo provides examples on both sides of the argument

Welcome to all. I am glad to see that there is interest out there in getting to the truth behind gunpowder tactical combat. Let me start by saying that the example was very brief as its intent was to provide a guideline. It is time to get more details down.

I do not believe in preaching to the converted.

Do we agree then that in the period of interest actual bayonet/rifle butt combat in open terrain was the exception and not the rule?

If we do, then it remains to establish what actually happened during a bayonet charge. That is because bayonet charges were initiated by those believing in Shock Combat. Some believed wholehearthedly in the bayonets and would rely almost exclusively upon it, disregarding the contribution of musket fire, but not of artillery fire.

Others practitioners, probably the majority, believed that bayonet charges would succeed agaisnt a shaken foe. Assaults were to be the Coup de Grace delivered upon an enemy that could barely defend themselves any longer. They used fire - artillery / volleys / skirmishers - and the threat of cavalry until the enemy infantry was seen to waver. Judging the moment right, a bayonet assault would be launched the success of which depended mostly upon your own troops not wavering themselves.

What did happen when battalions were launched forward?

The tension mounted on both sides.

The attackers had three basic options:

1. Afraid of a point blank volley, they would turn around and flee.

2. Move in close and, seeing that the enemy stood firm, proceeded to open fire. (See below)

3. Perceiving that the defenders were on the verge of collapse, they would press home the assault and it is here that the defenders would flee 99.5% of the time if we believe historical accounts.

Option #1 is easy: the assault failed and the attackers are routing away. Pretty simple.

Option #3 is also easy but in reverse. This is here that the most casualties would be sufferred as the defenders have turned their backs and cannot offer any resistance. Some would be shot in tha back while the laggards and perhaps a few brave souls would fall victim to the trust of a bayonet, usualy in the back.

Option #2 is more complex. No side broke and ran. They are now facing each other, possibly but not always, at close range. The attaclers have opened fire.

This is where I draw my inspiration from du Picq who tells us that Once fire has commenced it could not be stopped. The officers would be helpless in stopping it and man's nature is to try and give two blows for each one received. Troops would engage in what du Picq calls "random fire", firing as fast as they could without aiming, heck even without leveling their weapons, especially the second rank.

Either you agree with this view ... Or you do not.

I have progressed far enough for now. It's time to wait for your input. Do you agree with the above? Do you have a counter argument? An alternate scenario? Sources?

The next step will be to see if existing systems recreate our interpretation of events, to what extent, and if they do not what can we come up that would recreate our perceived reality?

Over to you.

p.s. If anyone want to start a thread of discussion regarding another facet of tactical combat, please do so: we can have multithreads. The more the merrier.

Do you know the rules Empire IV ?

They are including several "flow charts" showing very well what occured during fights (fires and moves) in this period.

Apparently this set of miniatures rules is out of print. Since I do not play miniatures I am unaware of same. Feel fre to use these charts to support your posts.

However, since these are not 'primary source' they are subject to critics just as any other rule set out there. Perhaps ypu want to post one to see whar we are dealing with?

Once fire has commenced it could not be stopped

The Salvée, Gå–På and Highland charge would be examples where fire stopped to close for action. Are they being treated as exceptions?

In those instances was a charge started, then men stopped to fire, only to resume the charge later?

Or where the men firing then, when the moment was judged right, they charged?

In the first instance they would be an exception. In the second case they would support the rule.

Awaiting details ... Ga-Pa is to be found when and where? I am unfamiliar with thst name.

I could not google anything about Salvee either. Can you provide a link/hint? Thanks.

Notice that it was next to impossible to get men moving again but it could happen, especially if the battle tactics, trained beforehand and understood by all, prescribed a single discharge at close range followed immediately by the conclusion of the charge.

That would be an exception that should be addressed in scenario instructions rather than have the basic rules assume that it could be done by all. Certainly the average (pre) Napoleonic soldiers could not do it routinely.

The British Huzzah is simply that: in the face of an enemy charge, fire one volley (2?) and then couter charge. Its a one-two punch involving fire first, then a charge.

Or where the men firing then, when the moment was judged right, they charged?

Certainly the latter is Duffy's view for the Highland Charge, but this must be an exception to "Once fire has commenced it could not be stopped" since it manifestly could be stopped.

Salvée: see the Swedish section

http://bcw-project.org/military/tactics

Gå–På

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caroleans

The argument that once started fire could not be stopped seems stronger where the aggressive tactics of Charkes XII and the Maréchal-Duc de Luxembourg had fallen away AND the training of the Ancien Regime had also faded.

Hello.

Don't forget Chef de bataillon rules.

I hope that everyone had a Happy Holidays!

Now I would like to lay down some foundation for upcoming discussions by quoting du Picq. I hope that this make it clear as to what inspires proposed changes to the way we actually fight mid-1750 to early-1800's battles.

> His (man) bravery is born of his strength and is not absolute.

> Man must test himself before acknowledging a stronger.

> But once the stronger is recognized, no one will face him.

The last one is the conclusion and it is essential that we understand this. Modern military nomenclature would classify this as "ascendancy". This is huge in terms of consequences. Once a group of soldiers (men) has gained the physical and/or moral ascendancy over its opposition, all contest between the two groups is tainted beforehand with that notion.

The dominant side expects to win and is confident. The lesser side expects to lose and lacks confidence even before contact.

The British gained ascendancy over the French through their Spanish Campaign experience and this goes a long way in explaining their superiority as the Campaign progressed. The 100 Days were to be the "rematch".

Lower down the 'food chain' we can see that inexperienced infantry dreads contact with cavalry as they see themselves being slaughtered in the process. Experienced infantry knows that if they stand firm, shoot straight, and hold their bayonet firm the cavalry will break first. More in later post in infantry vs cavalry combat.

One way to give troops more determination was through discipline. Discipline gives you confidence foremost in others, and once this is attained the confidence boost permeates to your own spirit: you become stronger because you believe that you are stronger.

> discipline keeps enemies face to face a little longer, but cannot supplant the instinct of self-preservation and the sense of fear that goes with it.

> Discipline has for its aim the domination of that instinct by a greater terror. But it cannot dominate entirely.

> Discipline only goes so far.

Thus it is said that discipline helps troops stand longer but eventually, if the stress is great enough for long enough, anyone will break.

Some men know no fear! They are the exception. History is replete of stories of brave men and how they were unable to rally dispirited troops to the colours or themselves. They were swept along with the rabble, unable to influence events any further.

In gaming terms this expressed by a morale / quality / efficiency rating of sorts. The better the training and/or discipline the higher the rating and the better performance we can expect from such troops.

If you believe that morale is the dominant factor in combat, then one must give preeminence to that factor versus the material factor, at least in the period of interest.

> The determination of that instant where man loses power and becomes instinctive is the crowning achievement in the science of combat.

In other words, there comes a moment when the least action will cause an effect disproportionate to the means employed. Modern terminology: combat multiplier.

This is what happened when you read of a small number of men defeating a much larger enemy: the lesser side saw that the greater side was morally weak and about to break. They seized the moment.

This is the basis of my "intervention" in the world of (pre) Napoleonic Tactical Combat.

Currently I feel that the genre is dominated by the M&M School of Thought: Mass & Momentum. du Picq states that they are wrong and I believe him!

Do not get me wrong: morale goes only so far then reality (i.e., numbers) kicks in. But we are not that far along ... yet.

Why do you think du Picq's views add value?

They definitely add a certain picqancy.

Bien sûr!

Currently I feel that the genre is dominated by the M&M School of Thought: Mass & Momentum. du Picq states that they are wrong and I believe him!

Perhaps neither are wrong: Mass and momentum assist in a side's establishment of morale dominance. A sense of the inevitability and degree of the impact will certainly affect the degree of confidence of the defender.

For thse who do not know who du Picq was.

He was a Colonel in the French Army that actually fought in Italy and in the Crimea. Thus he had first hand experience with combat in the Rifle Era (that is before the advent of the machine gun).

Second, he was THE French military 'thinker' of that era, one who researched tactical combat back in the days of the Romans, Greeks and Alexander and up to his present. So he tried and analyze what exactly happened, how it happened and why it happened the way it did.

Not to forget that he had access to Napoleonic era officers and generals from whom he gleaned first hand account of their war.

The last reason is that once in a while you come across a writer who xpresses your own view much better than you ever could. In the social sphere I love Noam Chomsky but he is going out of business as old age has caught up with him.

By quoting him directly I thus satisfy many goals: my point of view is expressed clearly and briefly, and it is supported by an authority in the domain. We are all armchair generals with theories as to what actually happened. Armand du Picq says that we should fit theories to fit reality, not the other way around. So we may 'theorize' all we want, basing our deduction on logic and pure reasoning but actual events have a way of proving us wrong because we ignore the human factor.

I therefore use du Picq's words to lay the foundation for my upcoming presentation and conclusions. I can make edicts or publish my conclusions but without a solid foundation of how I arrive at those, you might very well be justified in questioning my writing.

By presenting the basis for my theories and proposals, you may question them up front and if you are right, then I must change my point of view, if I am intellectually honest.

I will quote others as well, where appropriate, but for now my main focus is on du Picq. I make no bones about my bias (morale factor) so you can see where I am coming from.

Mark:

Mass and momentum (a.k.a. Big Mo) have their part to play for sure. But their influencve on tactical combat is overrated in most cases. One could say that it 'dominates' the tactical combat resolution field right now. I will try and remedy this but if I simply state this and then present an alternative you would be right in questioning me.

Again, I must lay the foundation first if I am to challenge the accepted practices of our hobby. Even then I may count on but a few 'converts' as Resistance to Change is very real indeed. "Leave it alone" is not an empty war cry! Players would rather play with a familiar, yet incorrect, system than change their set ways. It is human nature to do so.

I will try and get there soonest.